Post by Coach Campbell on May 27, 2009 9:35:49 GMT
The Run and Shoot is an offensive system for American football conceived by former Middletown (Ohio) High School football coach Glenn "Tiger" Ellison and refined and popularized by current Portland State Offensive Coordinator, Darell "Mouse" Davis.
Formations and motion
The Run & Shoot uses a one-running back, two-slot, two-receiver formation, typically featuring at least two wide receivers, but sometimes four. Motion (i.e., having a receiver suddenly change position by running left or right, parallel to the line of scrimmage, just before the ball is snapped) is used extensively—both to create advantageous mismatches with the opposing defensive players, and to help reveal what coverage the defense is actually employing.
The basic idea behind the Run & Shoot is a multiple-adjusting offense; the receivers are free to adjust their routes as they are running them, in a dizzying number of options, in response to reading the defensive coverage employed. The quarterback, as a result, also has to read—on the run—the defensive coverage, hopefully with the same result as the receiver's efforts.
In the purest form of the offense, the proper complement would consist of two wide receivers in the outside positions on the line, and two "slotbacks," running-back types who could catch as well as run (eg. Ricky Sanders and Richard Johnson for the USFL's Houston Gamblers, both RBs in college), manning the inside receiver positions (just outside and behind the two offensive tackles). The NFL teams that used the Run & Shoot in the early 1990s used true wide receivers.
A typical set includes (along with the four receivers) one halfback/running back and the five offensive linemen (one center, the left- and right-guards, and the left- and right-tackles). The types of running backs vary from smaller, pass-catching-type backs to big, bruising, power-type backs. The frequent passing formations spread out the defense's players, causing them to expect that the subsequent plays will also be passes. If the repeated pass plays work, the defense is spread thinly across the field; running the ball between the offensive tackles, or just off-tackle, is now possible, and preferred.
Scheme Dictating Personnel and Other Advantages of the Run & Shoot
As the offense incorporates four receivers running routes on every play, it forces defenses to substitute extra defensive backs who excel in coverage in place of linebackers and defensive linemen who excel in tackling and stopping the run. The defense is forced to make their team smaller and move them away from the ball. This spreads the defense out, creating wider running lanes. This not only creates a physical size advantage for the offensive line, it also allows teams to play smaller, shifty runners who might not normally not be of sufficient size and strength to excel in the featured back role. RBs who might not have the strength and size to consistently break the arm tackles of linebackers each down, have a chance to run against backup safeties who are 50 pounds lighter.
Some argue that smaller, elusive running backs are ideal in the system. Really this is not born out. Erric Pegram, who reached 1,000 yards with the Atlanta Falcons, arguably fit that description, but larger power runners like Lorenzo White also had great success running out of the Run & Shoot offense in the pros. Run & Shoot featured backs like Barry Sanders and Mike Rozier would have excelled in any pro system. Perhaps if the New Jersey Generals of 1986—featuring the devastating power running of young star HB Herschel Walker—had ever seen the field, the formation would have been mimicked by NFL ball control advocates like Mike Ditka and Marty Schottenheimer and might now be seen as an ideal NFL running set! Logically, it does seem the Run & Shoot might actually be one of the better running sets around, but with the success of its passing game, few of the well known Run & Shoot advocates besides Jack Pardee & Mouse Davis maintain much of a running game from year to year.
This is largely due to the mismatches the offense creates in the passing game, which offer more pronounced advantages. If all four WRs are competent players, a team can consistently abuse the weakest coverage cornerback on an opponent's roster. Almost no teams at any level have more than three competent cornerbacks.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Run & Shoot over other competitive offensive schemes is the advantage it offers in personnel. The 4' 10" Mouse Davis has publicly stated that much of his admiration for the offense comes out of the fact that it turns the game from a game of size and strength into an intellectual game of speed and intelligence.
In many ways this last aspect of the run and shoot has never been fully exploited in the NFL, although it has been at the high school and collegiate level and in the USFL. In the USFL, Davis looked around for fast, elusive football players who could catch the ball. Almost all of these players were under 6'0", making them a bad fit for the NFL's pro set offenses which look for tall receivers who can win jump balls on fade routes in the red zone. In the NFL those shorter players would generally be kick returners or at best 3rd down slot WRs.
This reality allowed Davis to create high powered offenses in Houston & Denver with comparatively small cost outlays. In a league with an enforced salary cap like the NFL, a lack of demand for those skilled players and the relative abundance of those players could create a competitive advantage by allowing a run & shoot team more revenue to be spent on star defensive players at key spots like CB and DE.
This never occurred in the NFL, presumably due to teams/management/ownership wanting backup plans in case the Run & Shoot failed. The Houston Oilers drafted 1st round WRs who had the size to play in any set. The Detroit Lions drafted Herman Moore in the first round and often played with TEs. The Atlanta Falcons had Andre Rison. These wide receivers had the size to excel in the pro set and all three teams had high-dollar quarterbacks, so those teams' offensive salary costs were equal to or higher than their competitors.
When an NFL team signs two productive quick undersized slot receivers, a pair of fast backup WRs, a solid veteran RB, and a journeyman QB who understands the system, the league may finally see this cost savings aspect of the Run & Shoot implemented to its maximum benefit in the NFL.
In college, several schools at competitive disadvantages employ the Run & Shoot to level the playing field. Due to the creation of space, a 190-200 Lb running back can be a star in the Run & Shoot at an FBS school like Hawaii. The same player would have to learn to be a receiver or defensive back at an FBS school that played out of a pro set or would need to play RB at a lower level, like the FCS or Division II. Likewise, a fast WR under 5'10" will not be recruited by a number of pro set schools. Run & Shoot schools like the University of Hawaii, SMU, or Portland State can turn those players into All-Americans. The ability to score using talent those schools can land, gives Run & Shoot schools a good chance to compete with their larger budget competition.
In High school, there is often a disparity of physical size and talent that the run and shoot can render totally irrelevant. A school with 5 medium to large players who can hold their own for 3-5 seconds per play as linemen and a handful of runts can score on anyone if they are disciplined.
Formation History
The original inventor of the Run & Shoot, Tiger Ellison first started out with a formation that overloaded the left side for his scrambling quarterback. He called it The Lonesome Polecat.
A year later, he came back with a more balanced formation that is reminiscent of the formation below.
WR................LT.LG.C.RG.RT...........WR
...........SB...............QB..........SB
...............................FB
Other variations of the above formation are similar to the way Spread offenses like to set up their offenses. Originally, the run and shoot was set up so that the quarterback would be positioned behind the center in a single back position. The single running back would be lined up a few yards back. Later during his tenure with the University of Hawaii, June Jones used Colt Brennan out of the shotgun. The running back could also be offset to the left of the quarterback in the formation below.
X........LT.LG.C.RG.RT...........Z
....W...........................Y
..................QB..SB
Another formation that can often be seen with the run and shoot is the trips formation, where three wide receivers are situated to the right or left side of the line of scrimmage. Most of the time, this formation will created out of Motion when the W or Y receiver moves to the opposite side of the formation.
X........LT.LG.C.RG.RT...........Z
.................................W...Y
..................QB..SB
Names
While the formations often rely on a single back, 4 wide formation the names of the positions are also important. The wide receivers from left to right are often labeled as: X, W (Wing), Y, and Z with the running back being called an S-Back (Singleback or Superback).
Basic Concepts and Defensive Formations
The following concepts are key to understanding the Run & Shoot.
Throw to the open receiver. It's fairly obvious but if the receiver is open, the quarterback must recognize the coverage and find him.
If the QB reads 5 or less in the box, run the football. This means that traditional defensive formations using a 3-4 or 4-3 front will have moved 2 defenders outside of the "box" for coverage help. The "box" is the area about a yard outside of the tight end or offensive tackle on one side of the line to the other offensive tackle/tight end on the other side of the line and about 5 yards beyond the line of scrimmage. When you hear "8 in the box", that means that a safety or cornerback has walked up close enough to the "box" to be considered a run supporter.
Use motion and formations to spread the defense out and change the look. If one uses motion and the defensive back follows the motioning receiver, they are probably playing man coverage or blitzing. If no defensive back follows the motion receiver, then they are probably playing zone defense.
Motion Names
The following motions are used with those starting with R being to the right and L to the left.
X = Lil and Rob.
W(ing) = Liz and Rip. This is the most commonly found motion in the Run & Shoot.
SB = Lion and Ram.
Y = Load and Rose. Another commonly found motion.
Z = Lark and Rook.
Route concepts
The Choice Route is probably the most recognizable and continued concept of the Run & Shoot that remains in the NFL. Gives the receiver the option of which route to take depending on the play of the opposing defensive back. In RIP 81 X CHOICE, the X receiver has the choice of a slant or an outside sideline route.
The Switch Route allows for the receivers on the weakside or backside of the quarterback to "switch" as they run their routes. This often entails the X (or Z) receiver running inside while the W (or Y) runs outside so that the two receivers criss cross, thereby confusing the defenders as to who they should cover.
The Read Route is simply when the quarterback audibles away from the coverage that he sees, often the free safety.
Slide Route: Often employs motion from the W receiver or the Y receiver to form a trips formation, where one side of the offense has 3 wide receivers on one side of the field.
Go Route: Gives the receiver the option of running a go route (also known as a fade).
Hook Route: Gives the receiver the option of running a hook route (also known as a button hook or curl).
Streak Route: Gives the receiver the option of running a streak route.
Playbook Designations and Notes
There were six defensive coverages focused on (four were Cover 4 variations).
Cover 4: Often employed with a 3-4 defense. Often a zone coverage.
4 Invert: Often employed with a 3-4 defense. Often a zone coverage with one deep safety. Attacked with Switch, Go, and Slide being the most effective.
4 Cleo: Often employed with a 4-3 defense. Man to Man coverage with two deep safeties over the top. Attacked with Switch being the most effective.
4 Buzz: Often employed with a 4-3 defense. Man to Man coverage with one deep safety and second safety cheating up. Attacked with Slide being most effective.
4 Across: Often employed with a 3-4 defense. Often a zone coverage with two deep safeties. Similar to a prevent defense/dime defense. Attacked with Switch being the most effective.
Cover 2 Defense: Often employed with a 3-4 defense. Often a zone coverage with two deep safeties. Attacked with Switch, Slide, and Choice.
Cover 5 Defense: Often employed with a 4-3 defense. Often a zone coverage with two deep safeties. Attacked with the running game.
Many playbooks that utilized the Run & Shoot often had the above routes tied in with certain passing series.
The 60 Series featured the Go, Hook, and Choice.
The 90 Series featured the Streak, Switch, and Read.
The 60 Series often featured Rip or Load motion whereas the 90 Series often featured the rollout where the quarterback would run to the left or right and sit, waiting for the play to develop.
50 Series: QB 2-3 Step Drop. Even number plays, Y has free release. W has check release. On odd number plays, Y has check release and W has free release. S back has check release on call side.
60 Series: QB will roll out to right side on 60 and roll out to left side on 61.
90 Series: Mirror 60.
81 Series: Mirror 61.
460/461 Series: Screen pass. QB sells as if 60/61 or 90/91. RB splits into passing lane as if 80/81 or 90/91.
900 (Pick) Series: Utilized or audible to against the blitz or man-to-man coverage under.
84/85: Running play. 84 is a draw play right side. 85 is a draw play left side.
88/89: Running play. 88 is a pitch outside right side. 89 is a pitch outside left side.
80/81: Running play. Most often off tackle right side or counter inside middle.
74/75: Running play. 74 is a counter run outside right side. 75 is a counter run outside left side.
Dive: Running play. Dive up the middle.
18/19: Running play. Speed option. 18 is an option right and 19 is an option left.
[edit] Run and Shoot in Videogames
In the Sega Genesis version of Tecmo Super Bowl, there were five pass plays designated with the Run and Shoot. Here's a quick look at the plays and the routes designed for them.
Name: Flare C
X runs a streak. W runs a square in. SB runs a delayed streak next to the X receiver. A Switch Route is shown, with the Y receiver and Z receiver both running streaks. The QB moves back initially, then rolls right and waits.
Name: Z Fly
X runs a little square in. W runs a streak. SB blocks left while QB rolls right. Y runs a square out and Z runs a streak.
Name: 3-Wing
X runs a streak. A Trips Formation to the right is shown with the W running a square in before switching into a streak. Y runs a square in and Z runs a streak. The SB is offset right and swings left to block while the QB rolls out right.
Name: Y Up
X runs a square in. W runs a skinny post inside. W runs a streak and Z runs a skinny corner post. The SB swings out to the left into a streak while the QB rolls out to the right.
Name: Redgun Z Slant
X runs a streak. This features a Trips Formation to the left where Y runs a rounded square in, W motions and runs a sharp square in just past the defensive line, and Z runs a streak. The SB is offset right and runs horizontal to the line of scrimmage while the QB sits in shotgun.
In the Sega Genesis version of Madden '95, there is a run and shoot formation with eight different plays.
In & Out
PA Pass
HB Counter (Starts left and counters right)
Posts Corner
HB Toss (Pitch to the right)
Hooks
Deep Posts
WR Screen
Negatives of the Run and Shoot
Many derided the offense due to teams not carrying tight ends, notable with the Houston Oilers. This also forced the defenses to struggle while practicing for upcoming games, as they did not have a tight end to block against and could not prepare for more conventional offenses. Along with the lack of a tight end, the running back or fullbacks were often relied upon to pick up the blitzing linebacker or safety, often resulting in many hits or sacks of any unathletic quarterback.
The offense is derided for not appearing in a Super Bowl, although this is a questionable argument due in part to the short tenure of the offense in the NFL as a base use and the appearance in the Championship Game by two different teams using the offense.
A criticism of the offense is that teams would often continue to rely upon the pass rather than establish the run or finish off the game with the running game. While many run and shoot teams were incredibly effective running the ball, the 41-38 loss in the playoffs is looked at as the epitome of this complaint. After earnig a 35-3 lead, the Houston Oilers called 22 pass plays against only four runs in the second half in their eventual loss, rather than winding the clock down with the running game and preserving the lead for the victory.
The lack of a running game is also a big discussion point about the run and shoot. Again, while the teams have had success, the recent focus on the pass over the run within the offense has caused critics to call into question how a team can be successful running the offense this way. The Spread offense has been lauded in part because it emphasizes the run in comparison to the run and shoot. An ideal balance for a game would seem to be between 35-40 passes and 15-20 carries overall.
Many commentators noted that the Run and Shoot is less effective in the "Red Zone" when the offense is less than 20 yards from the goal line. Here the offense is less able to spread the field and the end line acts as a "12th man" for the defense.
[edit] Teams Using the Run & Shoot
The following colleges and teams used the Run & Shoot as their football formation for at least a little while. Some had more success than others.
1974 Portland State: 5-6 (272 vs. 227)
1975 Portland State: 8-3 (366 vs. 196)
1976 Portland State: 8-3 (424 vs. 194)
1977 Portland State: 7-4 (416 vs. 222)
1978 Portland State: 5-6 (337 vs. 337)
1979 Minnesota: 4-6-1 (264 vs. 271)
1979 Portland State University: 6-5 (377 vs. 271)
1980 Florida: 8-4 (256 vs. 186) - Won Tangerine Bowl
1980 Portland State: 8-3 (541 vs. 209)
1981 California: 2-9 (150 vs. 264)
1981 Florida: 7-5 (284 vs. 166) - Lost Peach Bowl
1982 Florida: 8-4 (296 vs. 228) - Lost Bluebonnet Bowl
1982 Toronto Argonauts: 9-6-1 (426 vs. 426) - Lost Grey Cup
1983 Florida: 9-2-1 (304 vs. 156) - Won Gator Bowl
1983 Toronto Argonauts: 12-4 (452 vs. 328) - Won Grey Cup
1984 Georgia Southern: 8-3 (342 vs. 215)
1984 Houston Gamblers: 13-5 (618 vs. 400) - Lost Division Game
1984 Rice: 1-10 (213 vs. 382)
1984 Widener:
1985 California-State Northridge[1]:
1985 Denver Gold: 11-7 (433 vs. 385) - Lost Division Game
1985 Georgia Southern: 13-2 (460 vs. 293) - Won Division I-AA Championship
1985 Houston Gamblers: 10-8 (544 vs. 388) - Lost Division Game
1985 New Mexico State: 1-10 (190 vs. 369)
1985 Rice: 3-8 (233 vs. 404)
1985 Widener:
1986 Cincinnati: 5-6 (267 vs. 345)
1986 East Carolina: 3-8 (187 vs. 364)
1986 Holy Cross: 10-1 (314 vs. 148)
1986 New Haven: 8-2 (266 vs. 161)
1986 New Mexico: 4-8 (317 vs. 338)
1986 Oregon Tech:
1986 Pittsburgh: 6-4-1 (253 vs. 209)
1986 Rutgers: 6-4-1 (221 vs. 189)
1986 South Carolina[2]: 3-6-2 (313 vs. 286)
1986 Wyoming[3]: 6-6 (299 vs. 272)
1987 Holy Cross: 11-0 (511 vs. 110) - Patriot League Champions
1987 Houston: 4-6-1 (284 vs. 292)
1987 New Haven: 8-2 (267 vs. 134)
1987 Oregon Tech:
1987 South Carolina: 8-4 (341 vs. 141) - Lost Gator Bowl
1987 Wyoming: 10-3 (426 vs. 271) - Lost Holiday Bowl
1988 Boston: 4-7 (230 vs. 285)
1988 Holy Cross: 9-2 (334 vs. 182) - Patriot League Champions
1988 Houston: 9-3 (474 vs. 219) - Lost Aloha Bowl
1988 Kentucky: 5-6 (217 vs. 208)
1988 Oregon Tech:
1988 South Carolina: 8-4 (232 vs. 224) - Lost Liberty Bowl
1988 Southwest Louisiana:
1988 Stanford: 3-6-2 (238 vs. 216)
1988 Wyoming: 11-2 (511 vs. 280) - Lost Holiday Bowl
1989 Arizona (Flexbone): 8-4 (248 vs. 178) - Won Copper Bowl
1989 Boston: 4-7 (292 vs. 271)
1989 Detroit Lions: 7-9 (312 vs. 364)
1989 Hawaii (Spread): 9-3-1 (470 vs. 281) - Lost Aloha Bowl
1989 Holy Cross: 10-1 (396 vs. 161) - Patriot League Champions
1989 Houston: 9-2 (589 vs. 150)
1989 Merchant Marine: 5-4 (202 vs. 200)
1989 Pacific:
1989 Purdue: 3-8 (172 vs. 281)
1989 Southern Methodist[4]: 2-9 (187 vs. 499)
1989 Southwest Louisiana:
1989 Tennessee-Martin:
1989 Texas Christian: 4-7 (183 vs. 301)
1989 Wyoming: 5-6 (281 vs. 299)
1990 Atlanta Falcons: 5-11 (348 vs. 365)
1990 Brown: 2-8 (160 vs. 299)
1990 Detroit Lions: 6-10 (373 vs. 413)
1990 Hofstra: 12-1 (555 vs. 122) - Lost Division III Semifinal Game
1990 Holy Cross: 9-1-1 (339 vs. 106) - Patriot League Champions
1990 Houston: 10-1 (511 vs. 303) - Won Coca-Cola Classic
1990 Houston Oilers: 9-7 (405 vs. 307) - Lost Wildcard Game
1990 Howard[5]: 6-5 (261 vs. 205)
1990 Indianapolis Colts: 7-9 (281 vs. 353)
1990 Pacific:
1990 Purdue: 2-9 (177 vs. 337)
1990 Seattle Seahawks[6]: 0-3[7] (44 vs. 68)
1990 Southern Methodist: 1-10 (197 vs. 426)
1990 Texas Christian: 5-6 (292 vs. 353)
1990 Wesleyan:
1990 Wyoming: 9-4 (327 vs. 297) - Lost Copper Bowl
1991 Atlanta Falcons: 10-6 (361 vs. 338) - Lost Division Game
1991 Brown: 1-9 (227 vs. 372)
1991 Detroit Lions: 12-4 (339 vs. 295) - Lost NFC Championship Game
1991 Hofstra: 8-2 (380 vs. 224)
1991 Holy Cross: 11-0 (372 vs. 174) - Patriot League Champions
1991 Houston: 4-7 (353 vs. 344)
1991 Houston Oilers: 11-5 (386 vs. 251) - Lost Division Game
1991 Indianapolis Colts (Games 1-5): 0-5 (40 vs. 113)
1991 New Mexico: 3-9 (240 vs. 473)
1991 New York/New Jersey Knights: 5-5 - Won North American East Division
1991 Pacific:
1991 San Diego Chargers[8]: 4-12 (274 vs. 342)
1991 Southern Methodist: 1-10 (141 vs. 359)
1991 Texas Christian: 7-4 (279 vs. 264)
1992 Atlanta Falcons: 6-10 (327 vs. 414)
1992 Georgia Tech: 5-6 (237 vs. 286)
1992 Hofstra: 4-6 (177 vs. 261)
1992 Houston: 4-7 (378 vs. 386)
1992 Houston Oilers: 10-6 (352 vs. 258) - Lost Wildcard Game
1992 Maryland: 3-8 (292 vs. 365)
1992 Minnesota: 2-9 (200 vs. 313)
1992 New Haven: 12-1 (613 vs. 289) - Lost Division II Semifinal Game
1992 New York/New Jersey Knights: 6-4
1992 Pacific:
1992 Southern Methodist: 5-6 (212 vs. 276)
1993 Atlanta Falcons: 6-10 (316 vs. 385)
1993 Boston: 12-1 (436 vs. 211) - Lost Division I-AA Quarterfinal Game
1993 California-Davis: 10-2 (460 vs. 297) - Lost Division II Quarterfinal Game
1993 Georgia Tech: 5-6 (260 vs. 286)
1993 Hofstra: 6-3-1 (271 vs. 189)
1993 Houston Oilers: 12-4 (368 vs. 238) - Lost Division Game
1993 Long Island-C.W. Post:
1993 Maryland: 2-9 (243 vs. 479)
1993 Minnesota: 4-7 (253 vs. 354)
1993 New Haven:
1993 Pacific:
