Why Did Gibbs Like To Max Protect So Much?

Gibbs' best receiving threats were his WR's...by far. If you remember when he had Chris Cooley, he used him I think Gibbs wanted to give his QB time and let his athletes do the work. Many coaches now want to give all the thinking to the QB. Personally, I like the Gibbs approach--especially with young QB's.

Thanks for the comments fellows.

It seems so many teams, even in the NFL, are going to these spread offenses where the QB is in the shotgun most of the time and there are 3 to 5 wides. To me, it would seem to put alot of pressure on the QB because of the different blitzes and the number of hits some of these QB's are taking is amazing.

The only problem I could see with the Gibbs style of offense where the QB is under center most if not all the time and there is always max protection, is that there seems to be such great defensive linemen these days that are huge and fast. Many teams might rush only 4 guys but they are so fast and big that they can get to the QB, even with max protection and still have 7 guys in coverage. I know if I was playing a Gibbs style offense, I would want to play coverage and try and let my front 4 get to the QB.

Any thoughts?

Thanks for the reply oneback. The other thing that the 1991 Skins did was use ALOT of action passing where Rypien would move in the pocket with the TE and the rest of the line blocking gap or zone and the single back getting the EMOLOS. They did it in all situations, between the 20's and inside the 20's. It was a 7 man protection but they used it alot because I have tape of the Falcons Redskins game in 1991 and Rypien used it to help score 56 points and 6 TD's. I thought I heard it called speed protection but they did it many times in that game.

I read all of the entries on this thread. And every one of these statements are true.

But, there is another factor that played into that decision to use that "Flash/Lightning", and some of the other six and seven man protection schemes. That decision was out of necessity due to the nature of the teams they had to face on their schedule year in and year out.

Chiefly, you had Buddy Ryan and the Philadelphia Eagles who were blitzing coming off the team bus. The New York Giants had Lawrence Taylor and used a small variety of blitzes. The St. Louis/Phoenix/Arizona Cardinals were blitzing alot in those days. And then there was the Dallas Cowboys who were chiefly in those days a coverage team, but they would not hesitate to come after the quarterback. The Redskins also would traditionally play the Chicago Bears, and the (at the time) Los Angeles Rams who would also blitz above the league average.

One more aspect is that the Joe Gibbs system was really the antithesis of the Bill Walsh system in that Walsh believed that you should "never pass up a profit" of a short gain if it were open. The Gibbs system beleived in looking for the deeper route first, then working down to the shorter routes if the deeper routes were covered. This produced many big plays to receivers like Charlie Brown, Art Monk, Ricky Sanders, and Gary Clark.

I first attended some of Gibbs clinics while he was the offensive coordinator out in San Diego, and again after he took over the head coach position in Washington. I also was blessed enough to learn from some of his assistants like Joe Bugel and Dan Henning. I have used this system in parts, and we were fairly successful.

This has been a great thread, and brought back alot of memories. Thank you folks!

John Anderson
Host
"Coaches Corner" radio show
www.compusportsradio.com

You are absolutely correct! We used alot of Flash/Lightning for our half field routes out of the slot formation. Then, would motion in and out of it so that we could get some receivers out late if the blitz did not come. Since there are no hots in this protection, you are telling your offense that "you will block this up. We have the confidence in you to do so".

It fit into what we were doing with the running game with all of those 8-9 man fronts, and let us take advantage of those Cover 3 and Cover 1 match ups. We really never ran so much in the way of Hi/Lo, Scat, and Jet. But, we did run quite a bit of Charlie 10 protection in the play action when the DBs were playing off, and the LBs playing Run.

Coach, we really need to get together! You brought back alot of stuff in my grey matter I would love to talk to you about.

John Anderson
Host
"Coaches Corner" radio show
www.compusportsradio.com

Email me at billmountjoy@yahoo.com & I can better explain "Charlie 10" (some of this is hard to answer without playsheets)

I can't get the alignment to come out right. Basically the Nose is on the Center in a 0. Strong ILB is over the strong OG. Strong End is over the strong OT. Strong Back is over the TE, who is back off the ball in an H-Back position. Weak ILB is over the weak OG. Weak End is over the Weak OT. Weak OLB is outside the Weak OT.

Bill,

It did. It will take me a few days to digest that stuff you sent me though. I like to sketch the alignments out and see what the protection would do in certain circumstances. Our protection is a form of base. I would say that it tends to go toward flash/lightning in certain circumstances though because our center would go weak if no 0 on him.

With essentially the SAME blocking - the Redskins (on "Charley 10") would USUALLY throw HITCH off 3 steps (RB did not fake but released directly at, & blocked the ILB).

On "Charley 40" - same blocking but RB faked 40 Gut (Inside Zone) at that SAME LB. QB came back off the fake for play action.

Would be glad to discuss any of this via phone if you wish to call me at 804-378-0116 (between 10 AM & 8 PM/EASTERN)

Their passing game was multi-faceted, & very sophisticated. Hard both to explain AND understand. Just for EXAMPLE - it was the Don Coryell pass offense. Check out my research some of the main tenets of that. You will get an UNDERSTANDING just how much there IS to it:

"Air Coryell"



TWO IMPORTANT "LAWS" IN THIS SYSTEM:

DON CORYELL: "It was a timing system, and I had only one rule: NEVER PASS UP AN OPEN RECEIVER. You look...you look...and you look, but if number one or two is open, you get the ball to them. Don't wait and hope that number three or number four MIGHT be open deeper. And if you have any doubts, throw the ball out of bounds".

DAN FOUTS (Coryell's QB): "My rules for the Charger receivers were: 1) NEVER FOOL THE QB, and 2) ALWAYS BE WHERE YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE WHEN YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE THERE".


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#1 Don Coryell Route Tree

Article by Warren Simmons — TE Coach Washington Redskins (played for Coryell):


Receivers' routes are designed to look like trees. Branches shoot off "tree trunks" in one direction or another and in ever-increasing distances from the base.

Routes go either inside or outside, toward or away from the sideline. Even-numbered routes go inside in the Redskins scheme, odd numbers outside.

The routes are numbered, 1 through 9, with 1 being closest to the line of scrimmage and 9 being a deep route toward the end zone.

"An example would be a 1 (outside) route, where our receivers run that short stop route, which we call a hitch", Simmons said. As you go up the tree, a 1 is a hitch, the 2 is what we call a "slant" at the same depth, five yards. All the numbers have different yardage corresponding to the route. When we call a number, they know the depth of the route, and whether they're breaking in or out".

A 3 route is an outside break at 13 yards ("out"), and a 4 is an inside break at 13 yards ("in"). A 5 is an outside break at 15 yards ("comeback") while a 6 is coming back inside at 15 yards ("curl"). A 7 is a "post-corner" move where, at about 15 yards, the receiver fakes inside then breaks back to the corner. An 8 is the actual "post" route. A 9 goes for the bundle in the end zone ("up").

The routes are packaged to match the number of receivers on the field and are coordinated depending on what the offense is trying to do to the defense. While it is a package, though, the routes are independent of each other.

And there are what Simmons calls "the adjustments", the multiple variations for each pattern depending on what the defense is doing from the time the huddle breaks to when the ball is snapped. Each receiver must read the defense in his own area and react. The quarterback must read the entire field, then get the ball to the correct "adjusted" spot.

"It's a memory thing first, but then it has to become instinctive for the receiver to be effective", Simmons said. "And if there's an adjustment and the receiver and quarterback aren't on the same page — well, I guess you know what can happen then".


Article: #2 MORE ON THE DON CORYELL ROUTE TREE:

The Lion playbook goes back to Dan Henning's days in San Diego. After leaving Washington to become the Chargers' head coach in 1989, Henning installed what amounted to a one-RB power offense with two tight ends.
When Bobby Ross took over the Chargers in '92, he left the basis of Henning's offense intact while incorporating some of his own ideas. Now the Lions' head coach, Ross has taken the system and terminology he used in San Diego — which helped the Chargers earn a Super Bowl berth after the '94 season — and brought them to Detroit.
But it goes even further back than that.
"A great deal of it goes back years and years to the Sid Gillman era and to the Don Coryell era," said Lion offensive coordinator Sylvester Croom, who was Ross' RB coach in San Diego before the pair moved to Detroit. "A lot of these systems are hybrids or have their core terms from 30, 40, 50 years ago, really.
"A lot of passing games are in three digits, where you call the wide receiver and the tight end. The routes are numbered. You've got dive plays, trap plays. But the common language starts from what we learned when we played or from other coaches who preceded us. Then, we add our own ideas as we go through our careers."
Here is an example of an offensive play using Detroit's terminology: twins right scram left 585 crab...


First, let's set the scene. It's 3rd-and-7, with the ball on the 50-yard line. The call is sent in from the sideline, and the quarterback repeats the instructions to his teammates. The players break the huddle and move into position.
The first part of the play, "twins right," sets the formation. It tells the tight end and two receivers (twins) to line up on the right side of the offensive line, with a third receiver positioned on the left side, or, in this case, the weak side.
The Lions have specific letters for their wide receivers. In this play, the Z receiver is lined up in the slot on the right side, the H receiver lines up to the Z's right on the outside and the X receiver is the lone pass catcher on the weak side.
"Scram left" is the protection, telling the tight end to stay in and block. The "585" are the routes that each receiver will run. From left to right, it tells the X to run a "5" route, the Z to run an "8" route and the H to run a "5" route.
Teams usually number their routes from zero to nine. In this play, the two outside receivers will run comeback routes to the outside ("5"), and the slot receiver will run a vertical route straight downfield ("8"). "Crab" refers to the route that the running back will run. On a crab route, the running back swings around to the outside to catch a flare pass as he comes out of the backfield, if need be.
Of course, there are variations of this play, as there are for every play. If Croom wanted to bring the running back out of the backfield and have him line up in the slot on the left side, he would simply start the play call with "solo," meaning that the quarterback is alone in the backfield, and alter each player's pass route accordingly.
For example, a play with a RB-less backfield could be "solo twins right scram left 22." When a play has just two digits, it means that the receivers on both sides of the field will run the same routes. In this case, "2" routes, or inside slants.
However, not all plays go as planned. The way a defense attacks an offense has plenty to do with the success of a play — as the Lions may very well find out here.


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ACTUAL PLAYBOOK MATERIAL FROM THIS POINT ON:


ROUTE TREE FOR WIDE RECEIVERS

1 = HITCH (5 YDS)
2 = SLANT (5 YDS)
3 = OUT (12 YDS)
4 = IN (15 YDS)
5 = COMEBACK (15 YDS)
6 = CURL (15 YDS)
7 = CORNER (12-15 YDS)
8 = POST (12 YDS)
9 = UP

NOTE: INSIDE RECEIVERS (H/Y) HAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ROUTE TREE EXCEPT:

1 = FLAT (4 YDS)
2 = CROSS (7 YDS)
3 = OUT (10 YDS)
4 = IN (10-12 YDS)
5 = HOOK (12 YDS ½ WAY BETWEEN ORIGINAL ALIGN OF YOU & WR)
6 = CURL (12 YDS)
7 = CORNER (10-12 YDS)
8 = POST (12 YDS)
9 = DEEP SEAM

BACKS RUN "TAGS" (NAMED ROUTES LIKE "FLAT", "SWING", "CIRCLE", "WIDE" ETC).


BASE FORMATION "SPREAD"

X---------------O-O-C-O-O-O
------------H---------Q----------------------Z

-----------------------R


QUARTERBACK READ SYSTEM:

KNOW THE SITUATION
PRE-SNAP LOOK THE DEFENSE — ANTICIPATE
READ ON THE DROP — ADJUST
THINK: PROTECTION/ADJUSTMENTS/PROGRESSION/TIMING/OUTLETS
BEWARE OF THE MIDDLE OF THE FIELD LOOKS — MOFO/MOFC
KNOW THE COVERAGE ELEMENTS:
ZONE 3 DEEP MOFC/2 DEEP MOFO
MAN 3 DEEP MOFC/2 DEEP MOFO
COMBO STRONG MOFO/WEAK MOFO
DOG/BLITZ MOFC/MOFO
MOFO/MOFC?


This is the BASIS of the QB READING SYSTEM for Coryell, Joe Gibbs, ETC.

MOFO = "MIDDLE OF FIELD OPEN"

MOFC = "MIDDLE OF FIELD CLOSED".


POST-SNAP READS :
One of the most important areas in determining secondary coverages is the middle of the field (MOF).

We normally read the MOF in our drop back passing game. Reading the "MOF" becomes necessary when it is impossible to determine what the coverage is before the snap or to make sure of secondary coverage after the snap.

In reading the "MOF" the QB simply looks down the middle of the field. He should not focus on either Safety but see them both in his peripheral vision.

A) MOFO: If neither Safety shows up in the "MOF", and both are deep, it will indicate a form of Cover 2. A quick check of Corner alignment and play will indicate whether it is a 2/Man or 2/Zone. If neither Safety shows up in the "square" and both are shallow, it will indicate a Cover 0 (blitz look).

B) MOFC: If the Strong Safety shows up in the "MOF", this will indicate a Cover 3 rolled weak or possibly a Cover 1.

C) MOFC: If the Weak Safety shows up in the "MOF", this will indicate a strong side coverage. It could be a Cover 3 or a Cover 1. If the coverage is Cover 3, it could be a Cover 3/Sky (Safety), or a Cover 3/Cloud (Corner), depending on who has the short zone.

IMPORTANT NOTE: When EITHER of the Safeties shows up in the "MOF", the best percentage area to throw the ball in is the side that he came from! If NEITHER of the Safeties show up in the "MOF" — throwing the ball into the "MOF" is a high percentage throw.




QUARTERBACK STEPS IN THROWING THE DON CORYELL ROUTE TREE:

Our setup areas vary according to the type of pass (route or pattern) being thrown. It is measured in length of stride:

- 1 and 2 (3 steps)

- 8,6,3,5 (3 and 2) (5 steps)

- 7,9,4 (5 and 2) (7 steps)


*********************************************************************


PROTECTIONS

1. "BASE" (7 OR 8 MAN PROTECTION) = Offensive line will use MAN BLOCKING PRINCIPLES giving us a SOLID FRONT. The Center blocks #0; the Guards block #1; the Tackles block #2; the RB & HB block #3 (& release if they don't come). TE CAN check out off #4 strong.
NOTE: Must be alert for a FIRM CALL with this protection—QB is alerting you that he is taking a 3 step drop — shorter drop! Other calls ("FAN", etc.) may be made. The CALL SIDE in this protection = the formation strength! Possible break offs weak side (not needed strong if TE checks #4) - and no hots.

2. "OH" (7 OR 8 MAN PROTECTION) = Same as "BASE" except TE takes RB's block — HB takes TE's route (CAN check out off #4 strong) - & RB takes HB's block. Possible break offs weak (not needed strong if HB checks #4) — and no hots.

3. "SCRAM" (7 MAN PROTECTION) = Weak side pass protection — man blocking principles. RB has free release to protection call side (weak side). TE blocks #3 strong. Weak side - first UNCOVERED lineman from Center box to call side will have a DUAL READ (LB to #3). The CALL SIDE in this protection = the formation weak side! Possible hots & break offs weak side (no break off needed strong if HB checks #4).

4. "SCAT" (6 MAN PROTECTION) = Strong side pass protection — man blocking principles. RB has blocking responsibility same as "BASE" (#3) but to weak side! TE & HB free release. On the strong side - first uncovered lineman from Center box to the call side will have a DUAL READ (LB to #3). The CALL SIDE in this protection = the formation strength! Possible hots (strong side) & break offs (weak side).

5. "OPTION SINGLE" (7 MAN PROTECTION) = Slide protection blocking with TE blocking #3 strong side and HB free releasing. RB double checks strong side LB to 4th rusher strong. The CALL SIDE in this protection = the formation weak side! Possible break offs weak side (no hots). Also used in 3 step game.

6. "OPTION TRIPLE" (6 MAN PROTECTION) = Same as "OPTION SINGLE" EXCEPT: RB double checks play side LB to #3. TE & HB free release. Possible hots strong, and break offs weak.

7. "FLASH/LIGHTNING" (8 MAN PROTECTION) = Same as "BASE" except H-TE-RB all check release. No hots or break offs needed. NOTE: Same as "ROBERT/LARRY" protection except RB can free release weak in certain situations.

8. "LO/ HI" (7 MAN PROTECTION) = Same as "BASE" except RB normally checks out to the side of HB's free release (opposite of side TE is checking out on). The CALL SIDE in this protection = formation strength. Possible break offs to both sides. Also used in 3 step game.


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In this system - they consider ALL formations to be in 1 of 2 categories:

1. "PRO SETS" (TE & FLANKER on same side). The 3 digit NUMBERS are called from: Weakside WR (Split End), to Inside Receiver (TE), to Strongside WR (Flanker). Backs' routes are "TAGGED".

2. "SLOT SETS" (Split End & Flanker on same side). The 3 digit NUMBERS are called from: Backside TE (MAY or MAY NOT be split out), to Slot Receiver (Flanker), to WR (Split End). Backs' routes are "tagged".

This in itself can be difficult. Try it & see.

PRO:

-1------------------------------2--------------3
-X---------------O-O-C-O-O-Y
---------------H------Q-----------------------Z

-----------------------R


SLOT:

------------------1------------------------2-----3
------------------Y-O-O-C-O-O----------------X
--------------------------Q-------H--------Z

--------------------------R


First Call = PROTCTION (named)

Second Call = RECEIVER PATTERN (numbered)

Third Call = BACKS' ROUTE(S) = named.

PASS STRENGTH IS ALWAYS THE TWO RECEIVER SIDE.

Might sound like this:

SPREAD RIGHT (formation)
BASE (protection)
5 8 5 (receiver pattern)
R Cross/H Sneak (back routes)


MORE ON FORMATION STRUCTURE

THE FIRST FAMILY OF FORMATIONS IS ARRIVED AT BY ALIGNMENT OF "H" — THERE ARE 7 BASIC FORMATIONS (14 COUNTING OPPOSITES):


-------O---------------O-O-C-O-O-O
----------------1---2--------Q----------6-------7----Z

-------------------------3----4----5
-------------------------------R


#1 = "DOUBLE"
#2 = "SPREAD"
#3 = "FAR"
#4 = "DOT" (I)
#5 = "NEAR"
#6 = "TRIPS"
#7 = "TRAIN"

THE SECOND FAMILY OF 7 FORMATIONS (14 COUNTING OPPOSITES) IS THE "SLOT" FAMILY. SIMPLY BY MOVING "Z" OVER JUST INSIDE X ON THE ABOVE FORMATIONS, YOU HAVE 7 MORE (14 COUNTING OPPOSITES). YOU NOW HAVE 14 FORMATIONS EACH SIDE (28 COUNTING OPPOSITES) BY SIMPLY MOVING "H" IN THE FIRST DIAGRAM, AND "Z" IN THE SECOND DIAGRAM.


----------O---------------O-O-C-O-O-O
--------------Z---1----2-------Q----------6-------7

----------------------------3---4-----5
---------------------------------R


#1 = "DOUBLE-SLOT"
#2 = "SPREAD-SLOT"
#3 = "FAR-SLOT"
#4 = "DOT-SLOT"
#5 = "NEAR-SLOT"
#6 = "TRIPS-SLOT"
#7 = "TRAIN-SLOT"

THESE ARE THE BASIC 14 (28) FORMATIONS IN THE JOE GIBBS PACKAGE. THERE ARE OTHERS, OF COURSE ("BUNCH", ETC), BUT THE ABOVE IS THE STARTING POINT IN TEACHING FORMATIONS.


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PERSONNEL GROUPINGS:

"BASE" = 2 TE — 2 WR — 1 RB

"POSSE" = 1 TE — 3 WR — 1 RB

"LIGHT" = 0 TE — 4 WR — 1 RB

"JUMBO" = 3 TE — 1 WR — 1 RB

"HEAVY" = 4 TE — 0 WR — 1 RB


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"MOVEMENT"

MOVEMENT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR TOTAL OFFENSIVE SYSTEM. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR MOVEMENT IN OUR OFFENSE; AMONG THE MOST PROMINENT REASONS ARE:

1. To create a personnel advantage by creating mis-matches on our Receivers or Backs.

2. To create a personnel advantage by effecting changes in run support and force responsibilities.

3. To create secondary movement in an effort to better enable our Quarterback to recognize coverage.

4. To get our personnel in better position to execute their given assignment.

5. To create problems for the defense in Man under coverages when attempting to hold or bump Receivers at the line of scrimmage.

6. To create an opportunity for indecision, confusion, and/or mis-alignment by the secondary.

7. To cause movement on the part of the Defense in an effort to realign their personnel with the coverage calls and changes and not allow them to set themselves and react to familiar offensive patterns. Make the Defense "play on the move".

8. To force opponents to spend practice time and effort on adjusting to movement patterns rather than improving defensive skills and schemes.

9. To create a visual complexity to the defense, yet be able to run the same basic plays from a variety of looks.



**************************************************************************************



SHIFTING IS A BIG PART OF THE OFFENSE: HERE IS THE BASIC "SHIFT" TERMINOLOGY:

#1 "SHIFT" = H & RB
#2 "STEM" = Y & RB
#3 "SHAFT" = H, Y, & RB
#4 "POP" = WR's LINE UP TIGHT & SHIFT OUT
#5 "SINK" = WR's LINE UP WIDE & SHIFT IN
#6 "EXPLODE" = ALL 5 ELIGIBLES SHIFT (A COMBO OF "SHAFT" & EITHER "POP" OR "SINK").

SHIFTING & MOTIONING TO NUMEROUS "FINISHED FORMATIONS" IS A MAJOR PART OF THE OFFENSE! NOTE: IF NOT SHIFTING OR GOING IN MOTION — GO ON A VERY QUICK COUNT!!!!!


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MOTION TEMINOLOGY

MOTION TOWARDS FORMATION CALL:
Z = ZOOM
TE = FLY
HB = MOTION
X = OX

MOTION AWAY FROM FORMATION CALL:
Z = ZING
TE = LEAP
HB = WHIZ
X = EXIT

MOTION TOWARDS BALL & RETURN:
Z = FAKE ZOOM
TE = FAKE FLY
HB = FAKE WHIZ OR FAKE MOTION
X = FAKE OX OR FAKE EXIT

NOTE: "H" IN SHORT MOTION TO BLOCK INSIDE = BANG!


ADDITION = DOWNLOAD BELOW:"MOTION TEMINOLOGY

MOTION TOWARDS FORMATION CALL:
Z = ZOOM
TE = FLY
HB = MOTION
X = OX

MOTION AWAY FROM FORMATION CALL:
Z = ZING
TE = LEAP
HB = WHIZ
X = EXIT

MOTION TOWARDS BALL & RETURN:
Z = FAKE ZOOM
TE = FAKE FLY
HB = FAKE WHIZ OR FAKE MOTION
X = FAKE OX OR FAKE EXIT

NOTE: "H" IN SHORT MOTION TO BLOCK INSIDE = BANG!

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When I coached the Coryell/Gibbs system in College - the passes in the following DOWNLOAD were our basic DROPBACK passes. We handed it to the kids (as shown in the ATTACHMENT) & made them fill in the PATTERNS on those sheets using the "ROUTE TREES": Try this as a "fun game" in order to see how the PATTERNS were developed. EMAIL me at: billmountjoy@yahoo.com for this attachment. Specify "CORYELL PASSES".

ROUTE TREE FOR WIDE RECEIVERS:

1 = HITCH (5 YDS)
2 = SLANT (5 YDS)
3 = OUT (12 YDS)
4 = IN (15 YDS)
5 = COMEBACK (15 YDS)
6 = CURL (15 YDS)
7 = CORNER (12-15 YDS)
8 = POST (12 YDS)
9 = UP

NOTE: INSIDE RECEIVERS (H/Y) HAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ROUTE TREE EXCEPT:

1 = FLAT (4 YDS)
2 = CROSS (7 YDS)
3 = OUT (10 YDS)
4 = IN (10-12 YDS)
5 = HOOK (12 YDS ½ WAY BETWEEN ORIGINAL ALIGN OF YOU & WR)
6 = CURL (12 YDS)
7 = CORNER (10-12 YDS)
8 = POST (12 YDS)
9 = DEEP SEAM

BACKS RUN "TAGS" (NAMED ROUTES LIKE "FLAT", "SWING", "CIRCLE", "WIDE" ETC).




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"Air Coryell"

The San Diego Chargers of the late 1970s and early '80s featured one of the most explosive and exciting offenses that ever set foot on an NFL field. The unit became known as "Air Coryell" because of the passing attack devised by head coach Don Coryell.

Dan Fouts

Led by Hall of Fame quarterback Dan Fouts, the Chargers' record-setting offense led the NFL in passing yardage six straight seasons from 1978 to 1983 and again in 1985. San Diego, which led the league in scoring in 1981 and 1982, averaged an astonishing 28 points per game during a span of 57 games from 1979 through 1982.

In 1979, Fouts joined Joe Namath as the only players ever to pass for 4,000 yards in a single season. But that was just the beginning for Fouts who followed up with two more 4,000-yard seasons highlighted by a then-record 4,802 yards in 1981.

Fouts was surrounded by a great supporting cast which included Hall of Famers Charlie Joiner and Kellen Winslow. Helping to make the passing attack so potent was an effective running game that kept defenses off balance. Running back Chuck Muncie carried the load during the pinnacle of the "Air Coryell" years. He had a knack for finding the end zone as he scored 39 rushing touchdowns from 1981 to 1983.

Here is quick rundown on the receiving corps that helped the Chargers amass more than 24,000 yards through the air from 1978 to 1983.

John_Jefferson John Jefferson WR "J.J." recorded three straight 1,000-yard seasons and scored 36 touchdowns from 1978 to 1980 before a contract dispute forced his trade to the Green Bay Packers. He led the NFL in receiving touchdowns with 13 in both 1978 and 1980, and was also the league's leader in receiving yards in 1980.

Wes_Chandler Wes Chandler WR Picked up from the New Orleans Saints part way into the 1981 season to fill the void of John Jefferson. He led the NFL with an amazing 1,032 yards and 9 TDs in the strike shortened 1982 season. In his career in San Diego, he had 100-yard receiving games 22 times and had the two biggest receiving days in Charger history (260 yards vs. Bengals in 1982, and 243 yards vs. Seahawks in 1985).

Charlie_Joiner Charlie Joiner WR This Hall of Famer was the consummate receiver who retired as the game's all-time leading pass catcher. He joined the Chargers in 1976 and in his 11 years in San Diego, he had 50 or more pass receptions seven times and had 70 or more three times. He was inducted in the Hall of Fame in 1996.

Kellen_Winslow Kellen Winslow TE A five-time Pro Bowl selection, Winslow changed the way the tight end position was played. During a four year span from 1980 to 1983, he caught 319 passes that included a career high 89 receptions for 1,290 yards in 1980. He finished his career with 541 catches and was enshrined into the Hall of Fame in 1995.
















Yes!

All passes were categorized into the various "READ CONCEPTS" (Horizontal Stretch; Vertical Stretch,; ETC.). Bill Walsh had 6 read concepts, & Joe Gibbs had 7 read concepts, etc. (we have 3-4).



Many people who have only a SMALL number of passes (such as Norm Chow when at BYU) relied on "memorization" on pass PATTERN CALLS, rather than calling each receiver's route.

The beauty of the NUMBERING system is that if you have a LOT of pass PATTERNS, memorization isn't necessary, BECAUSE every receiver is told what route to run!








95% of all football I teach originated with Sid Gillman.

Coryell, Walsh, Gibbs, Vermeil, Al Davis, Chuck Noll, and MANY OTHERS) ALL credit Sid with being the man that taught them THEIR pass offense!



Photo (L to R) = Dick Vermeil, Sid Gillman, Bill Walsh. Taken when Sid was in his 90's - shortly before his death.

billmountjoy has attached this image:




WEST COAST "TREE" (it's a few years old). NOTE: Sid Gillman's name at top right:

billmountjoy has attached this image:




"DASH PASS" SERIES was big in Coryell/Gibbs offenses, & one of our favorites with a mobile QB:






Final voting for the Hall of Fame's Class of 2010 is coming up. Which finalist who probably won't make it this time should be elected?

Don Coryell (Getty Images) PRISCO: Former San Diego Chargers coach Don Coryell. It will be tough for him this year, but I think he gets in down the road. And he should. The guy was an innovative coach who wasn't afraid to throw the football. His offense, Air Coryell, was way ahead of its time and a precursor to what we see in the NFL today. I know he didn't win a Super Bowl, but he was a successful coach who brought a lot of important, forward-thinking ways to the NFL. Look at the 4,000-yard passers; a lot of that comes from Coryell's influence. When most teams were playing stodgy offensive football, he was turning Dan Fouts loose, unafraid of the consequences of throwing the football. Coryell went to the playoffs in nine of his 14 seasons. I know his teams had some playoff failures, but he's getting in on his impact on the game. And believe me, it it's there. Just ask all the coaches today. Coryell is a first-time finalist and it can be tough to get in the first go around. Plus, he's in a class where Emmitt Smith and Jerry Rice are locks. Spots are limited. I would think Coryell won't make it this time, but he eventually gets into the Hall.

JUDGE: San Diego coach Don Coryell. He didn't make it to a Super Bowl. Big deal. He changed the game with his complex and innovative offenses, and those complex and innovative offenses forced defenses to adapt. Remember how dominant the Washington Redskins were in the 1980s? They ran Coryell's offense under former San Diego assistant Joe Gibbs, who did make it to a Super Bowl. In fact, he made it to four, winning three of them. Former San Diego offensive coordinator Ernie Zampese made it there, too, winning the 1995 Super Bowl with the Dallas Cowboys. Furthermore, Zampese mentored Norv Turner, who had such an impact on quarterback Troy Aikman that Aikman had Turner present him at the Hall of Fame. Oh, yeah, Aikman won three Super Bowls, too. My point is that even though Coryell didn't make it to a Super Bowl, his offenses did -- winning six between 1982-95. And his players? Well, I count three -- Dan Fouts, Charlie Joiner and Kellen Winslow -- who made it to Canton without stopping at a Super Bowl. If it was good enough for them, it should be good enough for the man who put them in there.



He should probably count '99, too, shouldn't he?

I'm pretty sure Martz considers himself a Coryell disciple.



Yes! Read below:

The real West Coast offense
Click here for more on this story

Posted: Friday October 29, 1999 07:19 PM
Inside Football - Dr. Z

When you get old, you get cranky, and lots of things bug you -- things that might seem insignificant to others. I get nasty when I read (or hear), "Everyone must do their own..." Singular antecedent. EveryONE must do his or her...

I go absolutely wild when I hear some TV yutz remarking (and they all say it), "There's lots of ways." Huh? There is ways? Are English teachers listening to this?

But that's kid stuff compared to the way I feel about the term "West Coast Offense." I've belabored the subject many times before. But here it comes again, this time keyed by a very interesting conversation I had the other day with the current darling of the offensive coordinator set, St. Louis' Mike Martz, who has put together the NFL's most dynamic attack. We talked about the Real West Coast Offense, the one he coaches.

There are three practitioners of the Real West Coast Offense, three men whose roots go right back to the beginning -- to Sid Gillman of the San Diego Chargers in the 1960s, and before him, Francis (Shut-the-Gates-of-Mercy) Schmidt at Ohio State.

The current trio is composed of Martz, whose offense ranks second in the NFL; Washington's head coach and offensive coordinator Norv Turner , whose attack ranks first, six total yards ahead of Martz's offense; and Ernie Zampese, whose Patriots attack ranks No. 5 in the NFL in yardage. There is a very strong connection here, and it goes back to Gillman.

"I was a San Diego high school kid in those days," Martz says. "I used to love to sit in old Balboa Stadium and watch Gillman's offense at work. I mean, it was just so great to look at -- Lance Alworth and Gary Garrison, and John Hadl throwing the ball all over the place. Paul Lowe and Keith Lincoln running. It was an awesome experience."

It was a beautiful offense that had everything going for it. At times it reached unheard-of levels, such as the 610 yards the Chargers put up when they murdered Boston in the 1963 AFL Championship. Push the ball downfield, work the seams, hit the receiver on the break. Everything timed to the max, every step carefully charted, receivers and QB all working together. And a punishing ground game to back it up.

No one could coach offensive football like Gillman did in the '60s. He said the seeds of his offense were sown when he was a graduate assistant on the 1934 Ohio State staff, working under Shut-the-Gates-of-Mercy Schmidt (so named because he took delight in running up big scores).

But San Diego had another hotshot coach in those days, Don Coryell, working across town at San Diego State, building a succession of fancy records with prospects who'd either slipped through the cracks at USC and UCLA or had been rejected by them. Coryell and his staff were frequent visitors at Gillman's pre-season camp. They loved his offense. They absorbed a lot of it, although Coryell added wrinkles of his own. Two bright young assistants on Coryell's San Diego State staff were Joe Gibbs and Zampese.

Gibbs took the offense with him to the Redskins, adding innovations such as the Bunch -- three wideouts bunched together, darting off into confusing patterns -- and the two- and three-tight end alignments, when he wanted to go to maximum protection. Zampese took it with him to the L.A. Rams, where he eventually became offensive coach. Turner worked under Zampese in L.A., absorbed the Zampese-Coryell-Gillman offense and then took it with him to Dallas, where he became offensive coordinator on Jimmy Johnson's Super Bowl teams. His Cowboys attack looked a lot like Gillman's did, especially the emphasis on absolutely perfect timing between Troy Aikman and his receivers.

Once, in 1993, I talked to a backup Miami quarterback named Hugh Millen, who'd been in the Dallas camp earlier that season.

"I can't believe the things the receivers get away with here," he said, "the sloppy way they run their routes. They'd never get away with it under Norv. If he told them to run their break at seven yards, that was it, not a foot more or less, because that's where the ball was going to be. And if they wouldn't, he'd get somebody who would."

Turner took the offense with him to Washington. For two years his quarterback coach was Martz, who had worked under him -- and Zampese -- on the Rams. And that's the link that binds these three offensive coaches whose systems are having such success right now. This is the bloodline of the Real West Coast Offense.

How did the term get its name? From Bernie Kosar, when he was a backup quarterback with Dallas in '93. I was doing a piece on the Cowboys. I asked him what the offense was like.

"Oh, you know, the West Coast Offense," he said. "Turner and Zampese and Don Coryell and Sid Gillman. That thing." (Bernie obviously had a good knowledge of NFL history).

I used the quote. It was picked up by a West Coast wire reporter, except that he got it screwed up and he attached it to the San Francisco attack that Bill Walsh had used in San Francisco's Super Bowl run of the '80s. What the hell -- San Diego, L.A., San Francisco -- it's all West Coast, isn't it? And that's where it stuck.

At first Walsh was quite upset by the misnomer. "Call it the Walsh Offense, or the Cincinnati Offense," he said, "but not the West Coast Offense. That's something completely different."

Walsh's concept came about in 1970, when he was offensive coach with the Bengals. The year before he had had one of the great rookie quarterbacks in NFL history, Greg Cook, a big, strongarmed kid who could also throw with touch. In 1969 Cook averaged 18 yards per completion, a mark that never has been approached since. The attack was long-ball, obviously. Even the tight ends got downfield. Bob Trumpy, Cook's No. 1 target, averaged 22.6 yards a catch, an unheard-of number for tight ends. Trumpy's backup, Chip Myers --Walsh often used two tight ends at once -- averaged 20.6. Even rookie Bruce Coslet, the third man in the rotation, got into the act, recording 39 yards on his one catch.

Then Cook went down with a shoulder injury. His career was finished. In came Virgil Carter in 1970 -- smaller, agile, quick-thinking. Carter was able to go through his progressions quickly and throw on the go; not blessed with a big arm, but accurate. So Walsh crafted an offense to suit him, a horizontal offense with a lot of motion and underneath routes and breakoff patterns, an attack that now goes by the misnomer "West Coast Offense."

Once I asked Walsh what his system would have been like if he'd had Cook for 10 or 12 years. "Completely different," he said. "It would have been down the field."

So he was annoyed at first when his offense was misnamed, but after a while, as it kept gaining more and more notoriety, he just shrugged. What the hell?

Which brings us back to Mike Martz and the Real West Coast Offense, as practiced with much success in St.Louis and Washington and New England.

"I couldn't have had two better mentors than Ernie and Norv," Martz said the other day. "We talk all the time. Ernie's the guy who really expanded the system, who put a twist on it. He kept finding different ways to get guys the ball, off different formations. But certain basic principles still apply.

"It's such a timing-oriented system. You want to get the ball downfield, yes, but you want to get it out quickly, and the timing portion is critical. There are no shades of gray. You've got to run in and out of your breaks -- boom, like that -- and you've got to be exactly where you're supposed to be."

I congratulated him on the trade that brought in running back Marshall Faulk, who, in the last two weeks, has supplied a nice change of pace to an offense that was beginning to look one-dimensional in favor of the pass.

"That's another thing that's critical to the system," Martz says. "Power running. You've got to be able to run the ball when you go to a three-wide receiver set, and you've got to run with power. By that I mean behind zone blocking, which is a big departure from the San Francisco system. Theirs was man-blocking, with a lot of cut-blocks and misdirection. Ours is straight power. Not many people realize this, but if we hadn't have gotten Marshall we were prepared to go with another excellent zone-blocking runner, Robert Holcombe. It takes a certain type, a guy who can run with power, who's good at picking his way through. Stephen Davis is doing that in Washington now, and that's a big reason why their offense is so good. Terry Allen 's starting to come around in New England.

"The good thing about zone-block running is that you can keep pounding away. You don't have the negative yardage plays."

I asked him whether he'd ever, in his younger days, talked offensive football with Gillman or Coryell or Zampese, before he joined his staff.

"Gillman?" he said. "Oh no, I was just a kid then and he was a God. I met Coryell a few times but I was too shy to talk football with him. When I was an assistant at Arizona State (1983-91) I used to go over and watch Ernie's system with the Rams, but it was too complicated for me to grasp. I admired it, but I didn't understand it. Believe me, I was very thankful when I got a chance to work with him."

And so are the high-flying Rams, St. Louis variety.





This is good reading, too!

The Real "West Coast Offense" Comes to San Francisco
Sunday, July 30, 2006 at 23:12:14 PT

By Oscar Aparicio

Here's an interesting tidbit of information: Bill Walsh doesn't think the offense he made famous in San Francisco should be called the "West Coast Offense." In fact, Walsh said that the offense 49er fans everywhere know and love should be called "The Cincinnati Offense." And it had nothing to do with the fact that the 49ers were the proverbial dagger through the Bengals' Super Bowl heart.

Contrary to popular belief, Bill Walsh's offensive genius did not begin in San Francisco. Despite the fact that Paul Brown was the offensive coordinator, he tasked his young wide receivers coach, Bill Walsh, with designing the team's offense. Walsh had just finished his time with Al Davis' coaching regime in Oakland (yes, 49er fans, our savior did work for the Dark Lord himself) and was well versed in the long-ball approach preferred by Davis. So naturally Walsh took the challenge and developed an offense that made St. Louis' "Greatest Show on Turf" look like midgets attempting to high jump.

In 1969, with quarterback Greg Cook at the helm, Walsh's offense was almost unstoppable. Three tight ends on the team averaged over 20 yards per reception. Cook averaged 17.5 yards per completion. How does that compare to current quarterbacks? Peyton Manning, in his record breaking 2004 campaign where he churned out touchdowns like P.Diddy does mediocre bands, only averaged 13.5 yards per completion.

With wins over the eventual world champion Kansas City Chiefs and the playoff-bound Oakland Raiders it looked like the Bengals were on the right path with Cook at the helm of Walsh's downfield attack.

When Cook, the consummate down field passer with a rocket arm, suffered a career-ending shoulder injury before the 1970 season Walsh had to adjust to a new quarterback with a different skill set. Virgil Carter, a smart, agile, quick, accurate passer with a mediocre arm from Brigham Young, took the helm for the Bengals in 1970. Walsh's offensive adjustments - shorter passes, timing routes, and an emphasis on the quarterback's mobility - led to the birth of the offensive revolution that eventually took the 49ers to 5 Super Bowl championships.

So what happened to that long ball approach that was tearing through defenses? What happened to Walsh's original offense in Cincinnati? Oh, It's still around. It is the real West Coast Offense. It is the Air Coryell offense that Norv Turner is bringing to San Francisco.

A journalistic faux paux led to the misnomer being applied to The Cincinnati Offense. Paul Zimmerman (now known as Dr. Z) interviewed Bernie Kosar when Kosar was with Dallas in 1993. When asked what the Cowboys offense (then led by current 49er Offensive Coordinator Norv Turner) was like he replied, "Oh, you know, the West Coast Offense. Turner and Zampese and Don Coryell and Sid Gillman. That thing." A reporter in San Francisco saw the quote, picked up on the term and used it to describe the Walsh offenses of the 80's. The name stuck.

So the Cincinnati offense, which was termed the West Coast Offense, has now been traded in for the Air Coryell Offense (more appropriately termed the West Coast Offense). And now that we've traversed the football terminology landscape, what does it mean for a fan watching the offense this season? Is this vertical passing game the Magneto to Walsh's Dr. Xavier? In a word — yes.

Don Coryell deveopled the "Air Coryell" offense while he was with San Diego State (hence the term West Coast) between 1961 and 1972. While coach of the San Diego State Aztecs, he often watched Sid Gillman's Chargers practices during the pre-season. From Gillman's offense Coryell added his own innovations and took the league by storm when he assumed the head coaching position of the San Diego Chargers in 1979.

The Air Coryell Offense has four basic principles. Stretch the field, protect the passer, confuse the defense, and run it down their throats. The offensive line is composed of the biggest, meanest group of guys you can find as to employ the power running game needed to pound away at defenses. The line generally blocks in a zone scheme, meaning they block and hit anyone that comes into a given player's zone. The offense is a passing offense though, and the wide receivers run intermediate to long-range routes. In order to give these routes time to develop, quarterback protection it at a premium.

Three wide-receiver sets are also a staple of this scheme. In fact, the three wide receiver set was a Coryell staple. Joe Gibbs, another Coryell coach, developed the bunch formation and the three tight-end set.

Motion and shifting is used to confuse the defense. No team best embodies this than the 1999 Rams. "The Greatest Show on Turf" was also a derivative of the Air Coryell offense. While with the Redskins, Turner had at least 40 distinct motion combinations. He used players like Larry Centers, Mike Sellars, Brian Mitchell and Stephen Alexander in various utility roles. On a per game basis, teams had to prepare for about 30 different formations when facing Turner's Redskins. Turner even went so far as to devote a 10-minute meeting before every practice to go over all the motions and shifts for a given week.

Compare this to Walsh's Cincinnati Offense. Walsh put a premium on smaller, more agile linemen who could pull on sweeps and execute cut blocks. The blocking scheme is man-to-man with each lineman being responsible for blocking one or two particular people. The wide receivers run short to intermediate routes and the third receiver is often the running back. Motion was used, but not extensively. Quarterback mobility was at a premium as quarterback protection often relied upon on a roll out or some shifting of the pocket.

Norv Turner's offense is going to dramatically change the way the 49ers look offensively. In reality, the league has been moving away from Walsh's West Coast (or Cincinnati) scheme since Dick Vermeil, another Coryell disciple, came out of retirement. Despite all these changes at least one thing is still the same, though. The West Coast Offense still calls San Francisco home.


CORYELL COACHING "TREE":

Coryell's direct development of future coaches included Super Bowl head coaches John Madden and Joe Gibbs, Super Bowl offensive coordinators Ernie Zampese and Al Saunders, as well as Jim Hanifan and Rod Dowhower. Adding to the Coryell coaching tree, Super Bowl offensive coordinator Norv Turner tutored under Zampese, and another Super Bowl offensive coordinator Mike Martz studied under both Zampese and later Turner. Dan Henning coached under Gibbs.


The REAL "Father of the Modern Pro Passing Game" is GILLMAN. Read the exerpt from an article ATTACHED below to see WHY is so. It is amazing:

Attachment: SIDARTICLE.pdf (109.19kb)






Don Coryell 'forever changed' football

Bernie Miklasz
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
Saturday, Feb. 06 2010

FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. — Don Coryell was the best head coach in St. Louis
football Cardinals history.

In Coryell's five seasons, the Cardinals captured two division titles (there
was no wild card) and went 42-27-1 for a winning percentage of .607. In their
other 22 seasons in St. Louis, the Cardinals won 45 percent of their games.

Coryell is a finalist for induction into the Pro Football Hall of Fame. The
Class of 2010 will be selected today.

Coryell's days in St. Louis represent a relatively minor part of his story. The
"Air Coryell" offense took flight at Busch Stadium II but truly soared in San
Diego. When Coryell took over the Chargers in 1978, he elevated his offense to
a new level, and his ingenuity changed the game.

The basis of Coryell's selection isn't his coaching record. He went 111-83-1
(.572) with the Cardinals and Chargers but never won a conference championship.
And Coryell was only 3-6 in the postseason.

But Coryell's innovations, influence and impact were profound.

Consider:

— Coryell originated the three digit play-calling system that most NFL teams
use today.

— Coryell invented the one-back offense. And as part of that scheme, he
developed an entirely new position, the H-back.

— Coryell came up with one of the most substantial innovations in modern
football by splitting the tight end wide, away from the formation. The
deployment required a leaner, faster tight end who could outrun linebackers and
outmuscle defensive backs.

Kellen Winslow was the prototype, and he became a Hall of Famer under Coryell.
Many NFL teams adopted the Coryell philosophy, and over the last 25 years we've
seen dramatically increased production from NFL tight ends. Winslow, Shannon
Sharpe, Tony Gonzalez, Antonio Gates, Dallas Clark, Jason Witten are all the
result of the Coryell design.

— Coryell's coaching tree has produced an impressive collection of top coaches.
Hall of Fame coach John Madden began his career as a Coryell assistant. So did
Joe Gibbs, who went on to coach the Washington Redskins to three Super Bowl
championships.

Coryell's top assistant, Ernie Zampese, orchestrated the offense that played a
major role in the Dallas Cowboys winning three Super Bowls in the 1990s.
Zampese trained Norv Turner, who was the offensive coordinator for two of those
Cowboys' titles. Mike Martz is a football descendant of Coryell; the Rams'
"Greatest Show on Turf" carried the Coryell imprint.

These various offensive systems spawned a long list of Hall of Famers,
including Gibbs, Madden, Winslow, Troy Aikman, Michael Irvin, John Riggins,
Charlie Joiner, Dan Fouts, Art Monk, Dan Dierdorf and Jackie Smith. And Emmitt
Smith is likely to join that list with his selection today.

Coryell's guys have rallied around his candidacy. Hall of Fame selectors (I am
one) have received a dozen endorsement e-mails from former Coryell players and
coaches.

"His forward way of thinking forever changed the game of football," Winslow
wrote in a letter to voters. "The playing and coaching careers of many
individuals, many of whom you have already enshrined in Canton, are due to the
thinking and implementation of Air Coryell. You cannot watch a professional
football game today and not see the influence Coryell has had on the game."

And in his note, Gibbs called Coryell "a football genius" and said, "Don
pioneered the way for an explosive passing game in our league."

This is Coryell's first time as a finalist. He's 85 and recently spent a long
stretch in a San Diego hospital, treated for a lung infection. Perhaps that
explains why his friends are demonstrating extra urgency in their request for
Hall of Fame votes. Fouts has been calling voters all week to make a pitch for
Coryell.

Coryell is probably a long shot. A maximum of five candidates can be selected
from the list of 15 modern-era finalists, and two of those spots will go to
Emmitt Smith and Jerry Rice. That leaves only three spots for Coryell and 12
others.

But the passion displayed by Coryell's supporters could be laying the
groundwork for a voting upset.

I hope so.

My radio interview about the evolution of the "modern passing game". Click on link (cut on speakers).

compusportsradio.podomatic.com/